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Introduction
Under apartheid the terrain of social memory, as with all social space, was a site of struggle. In
the crudest sense this was a struggle of remembering against forgetting, of oppositional memory fighting
a life-and-death struggle against a systematic forgetting engineered by the state. The realities, of course,
were a little more complex. Forgetting, for instance, was an important element in the struggles against
apartheid - forgetting the half-truths, the distorted interpretations, the lies, of the apartheid regime. And
the notions of "oppositional memory" and "state memory" themselves are problematic. They are
artificial constructs, obscuring the sometimes fierce internal contestation in both spaces. Then there is
the question of memory and imagination Memory is never a faithful reflection of process, of "reality".
It is shaped, reshaped, figured, configured, by the dance of imagination. So that beyond the dynamics of
remembering and forgetting, a more profound characterisation of the struggle in social memory is one of
narrative against narrative, story against story.
Nevertheless, it is true to say that the tools of forgetfulness, of state-imposed amnesia, were
crucial to the exercise of power in apartheid South Africa. The state generated huge information
resources, which it secreted jealously from public view. It routinely destroyed public records in order to
keep certain processes secret. More chilling tools for erasing memory were also widely utilised, with
many thousands of oppositional voices being eliminated through media censorship, various forms of
banning, detention without trial, imprisonment, informal harrassment and assassination. And, as this
paper recounts, the tools of forgetfulness were also important to the transfer of power - between 1990
and 1994 the state engaged in a large-scale sanitisation of its memory resources designed to keep certain
information out of the hands of a future democratic government.
Soon after the initiation in 1990 of the process towards a negotiated settlement in South Africa,
a number of individuals and structures in opposition to the state began to express fears that such a
sanitisation would take place. By 1994 it was clear that these fears had been well founded. (I) Not
surprisingly, then, when the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established in 1995 to
shine a light into the apartheid system's darkest caverns, (2) one of its specific mandates was "to
determine what articles have been destroyed by any person in order to conceal violations of human
rights or acts associated with a political objective." (3) The mandate provided the basis for a focused
investigation into the destruction of public records by the state. Given the complexity and extent of the
apartheid state, adequate coverage by the investigation of all state structures and records systems
proved impossible, and the TRC decided to limit the investigation to state structures subject to national
archival legislation, (4) thus excluding parastatals, statutory bodies which had not voluntarily submitted
to the operation of the Archives Act, "privatised" bodies and "homeland" structures. (5) The
"homelands" were responsible for the management of their own records, in some cases in terms of their
own archival legislation. The investigation further concentrated its energies on the activities of the
security establishment - preliminary research made it clear that initiatives for systematic destruction of
public records originated and were felt most acutely here (6)
This paper relies heavily on the work and findings of the TRC investigation, thus reproducing in
large measure both its emphases and its limitations. (7) From the TRC's inception late in 1995,1 carried
responsibility for liaison between it and the National Archives. When the investigation into records
destruction got underway, I was released to become an integral part of the investigative team, an
involvement which endured from late in 1996 until mid-1998. During 1998 I was contracted by the
TRC to collate information gathered by the team and to draft sections of the final report dealing with the
destruction of records. (8) The paper also draws on my own interrogation of National Archives'
documentation of records destruction up to 1994 (all of which was made available to the TRC) and of
subsequent follow-up investigations by the National Archives. 1 begin with an account of state record-
keeping, official secrecy and the destruction of records under apartheid, before detailing the pre-election
purge of 1990-1994. The question of accountability is then explored, and in the conclusion I offer an
assessment of the purge's impact - broadly on social memory, more specifically on the TRC's work - and
an outline of lessons to be learnt from it by a democratic state.
State record-keeping and official secrecy
Apartheid's bureaucracy was huge, complex, and intruded into almost every aspect of citizens'
lives. Controls over racial classification, employment, movement, association, purchase of property,
recreation and so on, all were documented - usually in a multi-layered process - by thousands of state
offices across the country. This was supplemented by the record of surveillance activities by the
Security Police, Military Intelligence, the National Intelligence Service and numerous other state bodies,
including those of the homelands. And large quantities of records were confiscated from individuals and
organisations opposed to apartheid. An army of bureaucrats - servicing registries, strongrooms and
computer systems - managed this formidable information resource. It is tempting to focus on the unique
aspects of information gathering and record-keeping by the apartheid state. But they need to be seen in
a broader, international context. One of the distinctive features of the late twentieth century state - and
globalisation is rapidly creating a universal pattern - is its massive accumulation of information,
particularly about its own citizens. It does this through both programmes with a service provision
rationale and the activities of bodies charged with various surveillance mandates The "new"
information technologies - the pace of their development means that they are always new - provide the
state with a capacity for such accumulation which is growing exponentially.
What the state does with all the information at its disposal, and how accessible that information
is to citizens, are key issues. Under apartheid the state's memory resources were horded with a
pathological attention to detail. While all governments are uncomfortable with the notion of
transparency and prefer to operate beyond the glare of public scrutiny, in apartheid South Africa state
secrecy was a modus operandi. Interlocking legislation restricted access to and the dissemination of
information on vast areas of public life. These restrictions were manipulated to secure an extraordinary
degree of opacity in government, and the country's formal information systems became grossly distorted
in support of official propaganda. The fundamental guideline for public access to public records was
provided by the Archives Act, which established that access was a privilege to be granted by bureaucrats
unless legislation recognised the right of access to specific categories of record. The number of record
categories covered by such legislation was insignificant - for instance, records older than thirty years in
the custody of the State Archives Service, (9) and deceased estate files in the custody of Masters of the
Supreme Court. On the other hand, the discretionary power enjoyed by bureaucrats was severely
circumscribed by a range of legislation containing secrecy clauses.
Even within state structures, the management of information was framed by an obsession with
secrecy. Every bureaucrat was graded in terms of a rigorous security clearance procedure, the grading
level determining an individual's right of access to information. This procedure meshed with a pervasive
system of information grading - commonly referred to as "classification" - defined by perceived security
risks. The Protection of Information Act, and various legislative forerunners, promised severe punitive
action against individuals defying the system.
The Archives Act charged the Director of Archives (the chief executive official of the State
Archives Service) with "... the custody, care and control of archives ...". "Archives" were defined as
"... any documents or records received or created in a government office or an office of a local authority
during the conduct of affairs in such office and which are from their nature or in terms of any other Act
of Parliament not required then to be dealt with otherwise than in accordance with or in terms of the
provisions of this Act." So the State Archives Service had wide-ranging powers over the management
of public records from the moment of their creation or acquisition. Other provisions of the Act
elaborated on specific aspects of records management - the physical care of records, their management
in terms of approved "filing systems", their conversion into microform, their accessibility, inspection and
ultimate disposal Comparison with the archival legislation of other countries reveals that the powers
enjoyed by the State Archives Service over the active records of the state were amongst the most
extensive of any national archives service in the world.
The legal disposal of public records involved either their transfer into the custody of a State
Archives Service repository or their destruction in terms of a disposal authority. Until 1979 it was the
responsibility of the Archives Commission, a statutory body appointed by the responsible cabinet
minister, to authorise the destruction of public records. However, while this authority had been vested
with the Commission since 1926, by the 1960s the Commission had become a rubber-stamp for
recommendations made by the Director of Archives. A 1979 amendment to the Archives Act
recognised the da facto situation by empowering the Director of Archives to authorise destruction. The
Act made it a criminal offence to damage wilfully a public record, or to remove or destroy such a record
otherwise than in terms of the Act or any other law. As with all national archives services, the State
Archives Service was obliged by limited resources to select only a small proportion of public records for
archival preservation To date no study has been made of the impact on the archival record of the
Service's selection programme. What is clear is that state secrecy ensured that the programme was
neither transparent nor accountable to the public, and that the programme was sustained by bodies (the
Commission and the Service) reflective of the apartheid system and shaped by its ideology.
Needless to say, efficacy in implementation is the most important test of powerful legal
instruments. In practice the Service was hampered by inadequate resources and by its junior status in
government. Only a small proportion of government offices were reached effectively by the Service's
records management programme. The inspection function, crucial to the auditing mandate of the
Archives Act, was no more than a token gesture. This, combined with the state's disregard for
accountability and the Director of Archives' relatively junior ranking in the public service hierarchy,
rendered the Service almost powerless to resist state organs obstructing its legitimate activities and
flagrantly ignoring or defying its legal instruments. Especially problematic were bodies located within
the security establishment. With the exception of the South African Defence Force and the Department
of Prison Services, these bodies' records systems were not subjected to professional supervision by the
Service. Indeed, there is no evidence of pre-1990 professional liaison between the Service and other
branches of the security establishment. It is not clear as to whether this abrogation of responsibility was
the result of orders from higher authority or was simply the result of the Service's leadership being
intimidated by the security establishment's powerful position. The consequence was that the
establishment was a law unto itself in terms of records management.
Also of crucial importance - and devastating in its consequence - was the vulnerability of the
Archives Act's definition of "archives" to divergent interpretations of the words "from their nature". It
is not clear what the Act's drafters intended to exclude from the definition by these words, although in
his speech of 31 January 1962 to the Senate, the Minister of Education, Arts and Science indicated that
the words were designed to accommodate requirements for secret records (10) The authority of the
Act over various categories of public record was challenged unsuccessfully on this basis in the period
immediately after the Act's passage into law. However, until 1991 the status of classified (in terms of
security grading) records in relation to the Archives Act received no legal scrutiny. In that year it
emerged that the National Intelligence Service had destroyed the sound recording of a meeting between
imprisoned African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela and State President P.W.Botha. The
State Archives Service challenged the legality of the destruction on the grounds that the Director of
Archives had not authorised it. On 10 December 1991 the State President's office secured a state legal
opinion (299/1991) indicating that "sensitive" documents - those requiring secrecy - were in their nature
not "archives" and therefore not subject to the Archives Act. Subsequently the National Intelligence
Service also acquired a state legal opinion (308/1991, 17 December 1991), which produced a similar
finding. The legal scrutiny underpinning these opinions revealed that the security establishment had
since the Archives Act's inception regarded classified records as falling outside the Act's ambit and had
implemented a government-wide policy for the routine destruction of such records.
Records destruction up to 1990
In the period 1960-1994 first the Archives Commission and later the Director of Archives issued
a total of over 4 000 record disposal authorities to state offices. As I indicated earlier, it remains to be
assessed to what extent the interests of the apartheid state were accommodated in this selection process
Within budgetary and other constraints, the State Archives Service monitored implementation of these
disposal authorities to ensure that public records were destroyed with archival authorisation and only
after the lapsing of appropriate retention periods. Numerous cases of alleged or actual unauthorised
destruction were investigated. Most involved disasters such as fires and flooding, and in some it was
clear that negligence had played a role. However, in not a single instance was the State Archives
Service able to identify sinister motivation, for instance the deliberate destruction of documentary
evidence. Over many years a dispute was sustained with Central Statistical Services (CIS) over the
latter's routine destruction of census returns and related records without archival authorisation CIS's
legislative mandate required the agency to ensure the confidentiality of such records, and they adopted
the position that only destruction could achieve this. The loopholes in the Archives Act's definition of
"archives" gave CIS the space to outmanoeuvre the State Archives Service successfully
Incredibly the Service's monitoring activities did not detect a government-wide policy for the
destruction of classified records until 1991. It is not clear when this policy was first implemented, but it
was certainly in place by 1978. In that year all government departments received guidelines for the
protection of classified information, signed by the Prime Minister and empowering department heads to
authorise destruction outside the ambit of the Archives Act. The guidelines did not explicitly challenge
the Archives Act's ambit. They simply authorised destruction without mentioning the Archives Act at
all. (11) This was in direct conflict with a standing directive of the State Archives Service which
indicated that all classified records were to be regarded provisionally as archival until such time as they
had been physically appraised by the State Archives Service. The guidelines were updated in 1984 by
the National Intelligence Service under the State President's signature. (12) How widespread or
stringent was their implementation by state offices remains unclear. Certainly within the security
establishment they were implemented rigorously. The South African Defence Force utilised a similar
parallel set of guidelines from at least 1971. Like their civilian counterparts, military archivists in the
South African Defence Force Archives appear not to have been aware of their existence.
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The great majority of the records generated by the security establishment were classified and
therefore subject to the guidelines' provisions for destruction In essence the guidelines on the one hand
obliged agency heads to destroy certain categories of record in the interests of security, and on the other
gave discretionary power to destroy records which had lost their functional usefulness. The TRC
investigation revealed evidence of widespread implementation, particularly rigorous in structures of the
National Security Management System, the National Intelligence Service, the Security Police and the
South African Defence Force The National Security Management System (NSMS) was set up in the
early 1980s to co-ordinate state action against anti-apartheid activities. It was headed by the State
Security Council, ostensibly subordinate to Cabinet but by the end of the 1980s supreme on issues
relating to security. The Council ran a huge network of sub-structures reaching into every part of the
country, relying mainly on security establishment resources but drawing in almost all organs of the state.
When the public debate on the destruction of classified records occurred in 1993 (recounted later in this
paper), the head of the Security Secretariat maintained that a full set of NSMS records were being
preserved and that only duplicate copies were being destroyed. However, the official responsible for the
management of these records from 1980 to 1990 was later to inform the TRC that the guidelines for
destruction were fully implemented throughout that period. Not surprisingly, the documentary residue
of the NSMS contains numerous and substantial gaps.
The National Intelligence Service (NIS) was established in 1980, inheriting the functions of the
Bureau of State Security (1968-1978) and the Department of National Security (1978-1980). The
systematic routine destruction of NIS records began at least as early as 1982. On 1 December 1982 the
Service's top management adopted a set of guidelines (Directive 0/01) which authorised divisional heads
and regional representatives to destroy records no longer possessing security relevance on an annual
basis It proved impossible for the TRC investigation to determine records disposal procedures in the
pre-1980 era, but the evidence suggests that NIS procedures were applied to any records which had
survived
The Security Police was a branch of the South African Police (SAP). With the approval of the
Director of Archives, they managed their records in terms of records systems approved by the Director
for use throughout the SAP but in physically separate record sets classified as secret or confidential.
Standing SAP instructions indicated that no secret or confidential records could be destroyed without
written authorisation from the Director of Archives. In the period 1960-1994 no such authorisation was
given. The TRC investigation determined that throughout this period Security Police records were
routinely destroyed in accordance with internal retention/disposal arrangements. In the main this seems
to have applied to support function records rather than operational records. Huge volumes of
operational records were generated, at head office, regional and local levels. To cope more effectively
with them, a microfilming project was initiated, probably in the 1970s. Originals of microfilmed records
were apparently destroyed, but not on a systematic basis. From 1983 a computerised database of
operational records was implemented. Again, it appears as if certain original records were destroyed
after the core data had been captured on the database. Nevertheless, in 1990 the Security Police
retained huge quantities of operational records in locations throughout the country, a large proportion
still in paper form.
The South African Defence Force (SADF) enjoyed a special status within the framework of the
Archives Act. It managed its own archives repository (the SADF Archives) and, from the late 1960s,
provided its own records management service (through the SADF Archives) to SADF structures. Both
functions were supervised by the State Archives Service. Standing orders required that records only be
destroyed in terms of authorities signed by the Director of Archives, and that destruction certificates be
submitted to the SADF Archives. However, as I have already indicated, from at least 1971 conflicting
standing orders authorised the routine destruction of classified records without reference to the SADF
Archives, the Director of Archives, or the Archives Act. The evidence suggests that substantial volumes
of records were destroyed in this way without any archival intervention. There is also evidence of large-
scale destruction of records generated by bodies related in one or other way to the SADF The South
West Africa Territory Force was a joint South African/Namibian force established to operate in
conjunction with SADF operations in Namibia. Its records were subjected to systematic appraisal in an
exercise initiated in December 1988. Decisions on which records were to be destroyed were authorised
by the commanding officer There was no consultation with the civilian archives repository in
Windhoek, the SADF Archives, or the State Archives Service. Records which survived this exercise
were placed in the custody of the SADF Archives. The Civil Co-operation Bureau was a special unit
established to disrupt or eliminate persons considered to be enemies of the state. It reported to the
SADF's Special Forces division. The Harms Commission of Enquiry into Certain Alleged Irregularities,
which reported in 1989, revealed that all the Bureau's records had either been destroyed or illegally
removed. The records of Koevoet, the notorious counter-insurgency unit which operated out of
Namibia, were reported as having all disappeared in transit between Windhoek and Pretoria.
The pre-election purge
By 1990 there was a well-established practice within state structures of routinely destroying
classified records outside the ambit of the Archives Act. Within the security establishment there was an
ethos in records management of almost complete autonomy from the intervention of the State Archives
Service. Nevertheless, throughout the state substantial and archivally rich classified information
resources were being maintained. Particularly in the security establishment, a prevailing sense of being
in control supported the preservation of records which in more uncertain circumstances would surely
have been destroyed. Such uncertainty was heralded by the February 1990 unbanning of the African
National Congress and numerous other organisations, and the subsequent initiation of formal
negotiations towards the dismantling of apartheid. Apprehension about certain public records passing
out of the then government's control became prevalent. There was particular concern about such
records being used against the government and its operatives by a future democratic government
The first state agency to act decisively was the National Intelligence Service (NIS). In 1990 it
decided to replace its 1982 guidelines for records destruction with a far more rigorous process to be
managed by an inter-divisional Standing Re-evaluation Committee. New guidelines were given to the
Committee in October 1991. The guidelines required the destruction of paper-based records unless
there were very good reasons for their retention. "Security relevant" records were to be kept on
microfilm or electronic form, where they were most secure and easier to destroy/erase quickly
Continued retention was to be reviewed on an annual basis. In addition, documentation of covert
operations was to be categorised according to sensitivity and security relevance criteria, with references
to the most sensitive documentation to be removed from the electronic information retrieval system.
None of this documentation was to be kept for longer than six years. Top management elaborative
guidelines issued in February 1992 make it clear that one of the purposes of this exercise was to sanitise
the image both of the government and of NIS in a new political environment. (13) Initially the new
guidelines did not accommodate Treasury requirements for the management of financial records.
However, in 1992, after conferring with the Auditor-General and the Director of Archives, the NIS
Director-General requested ministerial approval for the destruction of financial authorisations, vouchers
and related documentation. The Minister of justice and National Intelligence gave his approval on 3 July
1992.
Implementation of the new N1S policy seems to have gained momentum in 1992 but to have
reached its greatest intensity in 1993. Mass destruction of records, embracing all media and all
structures, took place. In a 6-8 month period in 1993, N1S headquarters alone destroyed approximately
44 tons of paper-based and microfilm records, utilising the Pretoria Iscor furnace and another facility
outside Johannesburg The evidence suggests that many operatives took the opportunity to "clean up"
their offices, irrespective of the guidelines. Systematic destruction exercises continued until late in
1994, with many of the surviving minutes of chief directorate, directorate and divisional meetings and
most administrative records covering the period 1989-1994 being destroyed at this late stage. NIS's
own requirements for the preparation of destruction certificates were seldom complied with. The result
was a massive purging of NIS's corporate memory. This was supplemented by the unauthorised ad hoc
removal of documents by individuals for their own purposes. Any attempt to quantify this phenomenon
was beyond the resources of the TRC investigation. Very little pre-1990 material survives in the paper-
based, microform and electronic systems, and the documentary residue for the period 1990-1994 has
been substantially sanitised. The one seemingly intact records series is minutes of senior management
meetings, which covers the period 1980-1994.
In 1992 the Security Police followed the example set by NIS. In March of that year an
instruction emanating from their head office ordered the destruction of all operational records, including
non-public records confiscated from individuals and organisations. The TRC investigation was unable
to determine either the precise source of this instruction or its precise content. The evidence suggests
that it was received verbally at both regional and local levels. The instruction embraced all media and
required the destruction not only of records but of all documentation of the records. In the months
following the issuing of the instruction, massive and systematic destruction of records took place. In
some cases records were removed to head office for destruction. In others destruction took place on-
site. In yet others private companies like Nampak and Sappi were utilised. With few exceptions, it
would appear that Security Police offices implemented the instruction to the letter. In fact, some offices
destroyed most, if not all, support function as well as operational records. But there were exceptions.
The investigation revealed that certain operational records were not destroyed by eleven regional and
local offices. Several thousand files also survived in what was the Security Police head office, although
most of them post-date 1990. Eleven back-up tapes of the head office computerised database were
located, seven of them still readable. And contrary to the March 1992 instruction, three offices kept
lists of files forwarded to head office for destruction in terms of the instruction.
As early as 1990 NIS's top management expressed the need for co-ordinated government-wide
action in the destruction of records. The first step taken in this direction by it related to the records of
the NSMS, which was rapidly dismantled after February 1990. NIS was made the official custodian of
NSMS records. On 29 November 1991 a circular instruction was sent to all government departments
requiring them to transfer to NIS all NSMS-related records in their custody. While the stated purpose
of the exercise was to enable the Security Secretariat to assemble a complete set of these records, it was
clearly designed to facilitate systematic sanitisation. The exercise was less than successful, and in July
1993 the head of the Security Secretariat, with explicit Cabinet approval, sent another circular to all
government departments, recommending that they destroy all classified records which had been received
by them from other sources, with the exception of those constituting authorisation for financial
expenditure or "other action". Special mention was made of documentation related to the NSMS. The
impact of this circular was immediate and severe. Across the country government officials began
purging the classified records series under their care. At the time I was an archivist in the records
management programme of the State Archives Service. I had professional contacts in numerous
government offices, and some of the more conscientious amongst them alerted me to the danger. When
I briefed the Director of Archives, I discovered that he knew about the circular and "had the matter in
hand". But when nothing was done over the next week to stem what was clearly a massive government-
wide destruction exercise, I leaked the information to the African National Congress, the press and
Brian Currin, then National Director of Lawyers for Human Rights. In the public furore which
followed, the state maintained that the step was merely designed to eliminate unnecessary duplicate
copies of classified records, that all originals would be preserved, and that in any case classified records
fell outside the ambit of the Archives Act. Currin then challenged the circular's validity in the Supreme
Court, identifying the respondents as the State President, the Minister of National Education, the
Director of Archives and the Director-General of NIS. In his application, Currin argued that state legal
opinions 299/1991 and 308/1991 were "wrong", and that the nature of "sensitive" records, including
classified material, did not exclude them from the operation of the Archives Act. On 27 September
1993 all the parties reached agreement that from then on no public records would be dealt with
otherwise than in terms of the Act "simply by virtue of the fact that they are classified, or they are
classified into a category denoting some degree of confidentiality". (14) Two days later the Minister of
Justice issued a media statement in which he stated that "Cabinet is of the view that state documentation
should be dealt with in terms of the Archives Act." (15)
Hopes that the loophole in the Archives Act had been removed proved vain. The settlement had
not incorporated Currin's broader arguments, and the state exploited this to continue its "legal"
destruction of records outside the operation of the Archives Act. The 1984 guidelines for the
destruction of classified records were not withdrawn. In fact, as late as November 1994, after the
installation of South Africa's first democratically elected government, NIS issued an updated version of
the guidelines which still ignored the Archives Act. This was a direct violation of the Currin settlement.
The Director of Archives challenged NIS accordingly, and the guidelines were revised appropriately and
re-released in February 1995. For the benefit of the media and oppositional groupings, in the wake of
the Currin settlement the state staged a charade of abiding by its provisions. A second circular was sent
out to government departments qualifying the contents of the first. An inter-departmental working
group was established to prepare guidelines for government offices on which categories of public record
fell outside the ambit of the Archives Act. When the group produced draft guidelines, the Director of
Archives (through the Director-General of National Education) sought a state legal opinion on their
validity. The opinion (220/93, 2 November 1993), without even referring to the Currin settlement,
simply affirmed the findings of opinion 299/91. However, the opinion did assert that decisions on
destruction should not be left to individual department heads and recommended that an advisory
mechanism should be created. This was never done
The full extent of the Cabinet's duplicity only emerged during the TRC investigation
Unbeknownst to either Currin or the State Archives Service, on 2 June 1993, a month before the July
Security Secretariat circular, Cabinet had approved a new set of guidelines for the disposal of "state
sensitive" documentation. These guidelines had their origin in meetings of NIS top management in 1990
and 1991, where it was decided to use NIS's own destruction guidelines as a point of departure for the
preparation of government-wide guidelines. The proposal was taken to the State Security Council,
which adopted the guidelines in May 1993, subject to a NIS investigation of comparative practice
internationally. There is no evidence that NIS conducted such an investigation. The following month
the Council proposed the guidelines to Cabinet, which duly approved them. They empowered ministers
to authorise the destruction of financial and related records outside parameters laid down by the
Treasury, and heads of departments to authorise the destruction of all "state sensitive" records meeting
certain loosely-defined criteria. (16) The guidelines were distributed to all government departments.
Carrying the weight of the highest authority in the land, their impact was severe. The State Archives
Service's own parent body, the Department of National Education, for instance promptly destroyed most
of the files in its security-related filing system, despite the fact that the system was subject to a State
Archives Service disposal authority which had earmarked the great majority of the files for archival
preservation. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that implementation was extremely uneven and
shaped directly by offices' positioning in relation to the coercive aspects of apartheid administration.
It is unclear to what extent subsequent destruction exercises were in response to or shaped by
the Cabinet-approved guidelines of June 1993. But clearly senior managers in state structures regarded
themselves as having been given the green light to sanitise records in their care. No records of the
KwaZulu Intelligence Service (KWAZINT) survived. KWAZ1NT existed between 1986 and 1991 as a
special N1S project managed in co-operation with the KwaZulu homeland. All project records were
either sent to or managed by NIS. During 1995 the remaining former homeland intelligence services
were integrated into the new civilian intelligence services, the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) and
the South African Secret Service. It seems that before then very little records destruction had been
effected by these services. However, between April and October 1995 a NIA Chief Directorate
Research and Analysis Co-ordinating Committee subjected some of the records inherited from these
services to a thorough re-evaluation process. Working both on-site and with records which had been
transferred to NIA headquarters, the Committee was mandated to identify for preservation records of
value to NIA from both operational and historical perspectives. The TRC investigation revealed that
less than 5% of the records were identified for preservation, almost none of them pre-dating 1990, and
that in practice the sole criterion for preservation seems to have been security relevance. The remaining
records were subsequently destroyed, the last destruction exercise taking place as late as November
1996. This episode revealed the resilience of attitudes and values from the past. Not only did NIA,
ostensibly a structure of the new democratic South African state, implement the sanitisation policy of the
apartheid state, in doing so it ignored the State Archives Service and defied moratoria on the destruction
of public records introduced in 1995 (17) After completion of the re-evaluation process large volumes
of additional records were secured at NIA headquarters from the offices of all three former services.
The periods covered by these records are as follows: Bophutatswana Intelligence Service (1973-1995),
Bophutatswana National Security Council (1987-1994), Transkei Intelligence Service (1969-1994) and
Venda Intelligence Service (1979-1994).
The South African Defence Force (SADF) responded decisively to the Cabinet-approved
guidelines. In 1992 Lieutenant-General Steyn, the then SADF Chief of Staff, had been appointed to
investigate SADF intelligence activities. On 23 November 1992 all SADF structures had been informed
that from then on records were only to be detroyed with the express approval of Steyn. However, on
receipt of the Cabinet-approved guidelines, the Chief of the SADF ordered their immediate
implementation, thus effectively repealing General Steyn's instruction. Two joint teams consisting of
Inspector general and Counter Intelligence personnel were appointed to visit all units and to identify
records for destruction. A countrywide destruction exercise followed. By and large this exercise failed
to produce the required destruction certificates, making analysis of its impact extremely difficult. The
TRC investigation was forced to seek a sense of the impact through probes into what it regarded as hot-
spots:
• Although subjected to close scrutiny during the 1993 destruction exercise, a surprisingly large
volume of Military Intelligence files have survived. As one of the South African National Defence
Force's (SANDF) legal team commented to me during the investigation: "They should have
destroyed more." Another instance of being confronted by a ghost from the past. Three discrete file
groups were identified at the SANDF Archives: group number 14, comprising 299 boxes of files
covering the period 1977-1987; group number 21, comprising 254 files covering the period 1975-
1987; and group number 30, comprising 529 boxes of files covering the period 1976-1996.
However, significant gaps were identified. For instance, no record accumulations of the directorate
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Special Tasks or the Directorate Covert Collection could be found, and only a small accumulation of
Contra-mobilisation Projects (COMOPS).
• No record accumulation related to the Civilian Co-operation Bureau could be found
• Spot checks revealed that not all personnel files could be made available, raising the question of
whether or not such files had been destroyed.
• Spot checks suggested that substantial documentation of cross border operations in neighbouring
countries had survived.
• Very little NSMS documentation managed by the SADF has survived The only significant
accumulation comprises 54 boxes of files (now in the SANDF Archives) generated in the Eastern
Cape and preserved for use in the Goniwe Inquest. However, some other NSMS documentation
was identified in each of the three Military Intelligence file groups described above.
• A task group authorised by the Chief of the SANDF in June 1994 managed the acquisition by the
SANDF Archives of all extant records of the former defence forces of Transkei, Bophutatswana,
Venda and Ciskei. These forces had been amalgamated with the SADF and non-statutory forces to
form the SANDF in April 1994. Apart from the I 544 boxes of files secured from the
Bophutatswana Defence Force, relatively insignificant documentary traces were secured: 80 boxes
of files from the Transkei, 115 from the Ciskei and 331 from Venda. Excluded from these figures
are personnel files, which were integrated with the SANDF"s personnel file series. Clearly, then,
huge volumes of records generated by the defence forces of the former homelands had been
destroyed.
By May 1994, when the new democratically-elected government took office, a massive deletion
of state documentary memory had taken place. This enforced amnesia was concentrated, for obvious
reasons, in the security establishment. Unlike their counterparts in the former East Germany,
Kampuchea and other countries. South Africa's apartheid leaders had had plenty of time in which to do
the job thoroughly. Despite this, surprising pockets of public records survived the process, even within
the security establishment. Some I have already detailed. There were others. From the perspective of
documenting resistance to apartheid, two are of particular interest. Firstly, the Department of Prison
Services, despite routinely destroying classified records in the pre-1990 period and acting on all the
1993 government-wide guidelines, preserved intact two significant file series: case files opened for
every security/political prisoner; and case files opened for every prisoner under sentence of death. And
secondly, the comprehensive accumulation of records generated by the Department of Justice's Security
Legislation Directorate. The Directorate was established in 1982 and endured until 1991 Its
predecessor was the Internal Security Division, and before that the function was performed (beginning in
1949) by various individuals in the Department. Its runction was to make recommendations to the
Ministers of Justice and Law and Order concerning the administration of security legislation, for
instance should an individual or organisation be banned? Should an individual be restricted? Should a
certain gathering be allowed? Legislation falling within its ambit included the Suppression of
Communism Act, Internal Security Act, Affected Organisations Act, Terrorism Act, Unlawful
Organisations Act and the Public Safety Act. It made recommendations on the basis of investigations
initiated by the Security Police. Recommendations were supported by information gathered on its behalf
by the Security Police, NIS and Military Intelligence. The evidence suggests that the Directorate's
records management was impeccable. Records were kept in accordance with State Archives Service
and departmental directives, with disposal being performed in terms of disposal authorities issued by the
Archives Commission and the Director of Archives. While the Directorate did routinely destroy
classified records received from other state offices in terms of the NIS guidelines, they ignored all the
1993 disposal guidelines. The Directorate's extant records, kept in excellent condition by the Ministry
of Justice, comprise the following: a series of case files for individuals, spanning the period 1949-1991;
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series of case files for organisations and for publications (the series for organisations includes files
inherited by the directorate dating back to the 1920s); and policy, administrative and other subject-based
correspondence files
Despite the large-scale destruction of records which had been taking place during the negotiation
process, as the April 1094 General Election loomed President De Klerk and his Cabinet became anxious
about what remaining public records the new government would inherit. Late in 1993 the President's
office asked the Chief State Law Advisor whether representatives of De Klerk's government could retain
custody of certain records after April 1994. A draft memorandum leading to the formal request cited an
obscure British precedent and indicated that one of the motivations was to "keep this information out of
the hands of future co-governors". (18) The records referred to were "gebruiksdokumentasie" -
working documentation - including Cabinet minutes and the minutes of Cabinet committees, ministers'
committees and the State Security Council. At the time none of these records had been transferred into
the custody of the State Archives Service, on the grounds that their "sensitive nature" excluded them
from the operation of the Archives Act. In his opinion 207/1993 of 22 December 1993, the Chief State
Law Advisor indicated that such records could not be removed from the state's custody. Also in
December 1993, President De Klerk referred the same question to Advocate S.A. Cilliers for an opinion.
Advocate Cilliers responded on 13 January 1994, confirming the Chief State Law Advisor's opinion, and
going further by disagreeing with opinion 299/1991 and its affirmation of the legality of the destruction
of "state sensitive" records on the authorisation of departmental heads. (19) Subsequently Cabinet and
Cabinet committee records were transferred to the State Archives Service, albeit with a Cabinet-
imposed ten-year embargo on access The embargo was ignored by the Service, with access being
managed from the outset in terms of the Archives Act's access provisions. In 1995 and 1997 the
surviving residue of State Security Council and related records was also transferred into archival
custody. Why, one must ask, did De Klerk and his Cabinet not simply destroy these records? With
approval already given for the destruction of numerous other records categories, why the fastidiousness
over these? I suspect that the answer is twofold. On the one hand, they were high profile records which
both the media and the new government would be anxious to see after April 1994. On the other, the
destruction of these records would involve Cabinet directly. It would be impossible to blame junior
officials for misinterpreting disposal guidelines.
Accountability
The routine destruction of classified public records outside the parameters of the Archives Act
had begun well before 1990. Sanctioned by the head of state, the process was concentrated in South
Africa's security establishment. Between 1990 and 1994 this process was broadened into a systematic
endeavour authorised by Cabinet, reaching into all sectors of the state and embracing categories of
record designated as "state sensitive". At the time and subsequently, those responsible maintained that
the endeavour was designed simply to protect intelligence sources and the legitimate security interests of
the state. The evidence demonstrates that it went far beyond this, constituting a systematic sanitisation
of official memory resources ahead of transition to democracy. Those responsible also maintained that
the endeavour was entirely legal. They pointed to the state legal opinions secured by the State
President's office, NIS and the Director-General of National Education in 1991 and 1993, which ruled
that "state sensitive" public records fell outside the definition of records which were subject to the
Archives Act. This argument is deeply flawed. Firstly, the legal opinions were disputed by the State
Archives Service, Advocate S.A. Cilliers and the National Director of Lawyers for Human Rights, Brian
Currin. The basis of Currin's successful legal intervention in 1993 was a rejection of the two 1991
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opinions. Secondly, the public position adopted by Cabinet itself was that all public records should be
dealt with in terms of the Archives Act. Thirdly, the state used the legal opinions selectively For
instance, the 1993 opinion's recommendation that an "advisory mechanism" on records destruction be
created was never implemented. Fourthly, Cabinet's approval of the destruction of financial records
outside requirements laid down by the Treasury was of dubious legal validity. And fifthly, the legal
opinions begged the question "in terms of what law are 'state sensitive' records to be destroyed9"
Several officials involved in such destruction pointed to the Protection of Information Act. but this Act
makes no reference to the destruction of documents.
Ultimately the question of legality is a non-issue On the one hand, apartheid was characterised
by "official lawlessness", (20) with rules and actions which were perfectly legal but lacked legitimacy
and bore little or no relation to the rule of law On the other, it is clear that the sanitisation of official
memory resources would have taken place irrespective of legal constraints As Brian Currin said of the
1993 settlement which followed his legal intervention, the only way to enforce it would have been lo "tie
up their [government's] hands and confiscate all the relevant machinery they can use to destroy
documents." (21)
Given its legislative mandate, the State Archives Service was the principal state agency
responsible for acting against the destruction of public records without archival authorisation In the
1990-1994 period of mass destruction, intervention by the Service achieved nothing. It followed up by
correspondence every allegation of illegal records destruction, engaged the security establishment in
debate around the issue, registered its disagreement with the 1991 and 1993 legal opinions, and forced
revision of NIS's 1994 (iuidelines for the Protection of Classified Information. However, it was
hamstrung by the apartheid system's disregard for accountability, by inadequate resources, by its junior
status in government, and by a leadership which was intimidated by the security establishment and
lacked the will to act decisively. I was a member of staff in the Service throughout this period, and
remember well how 1 and some of my junior colleagues pushed for such action while the leadership
chose to sit on the fence. Earlier in this essay I recounted the inadequacy of leadership's response to the
1993 Security Secretariat circular authorising the destruction of certain categories of classified record
To cite another instance, in June 1992 the Department of Foreign Affairs requested authority to destroy
certain special projects files. When the Director of Archives indicated that they should be transferred
into State Archives Service custody, Foreign Affairs withdrew their application and claimed that the files
were in fact merely empty file covers. My calls for an investigation were refused by the Director. More
damning was the Director's collusion with NIS in 1992, cited earlier in this essay, to secure authorisation
for the quick destruction of that agency's financial and related records Specific instances aside, not
once in the period 1990-1994 did the Director authorise an investigative inspection of an office
suspected of destroying records illegally. Not once did the Director undertake a face-to-face meeting
with a suspected perpetrator. And not once was the Archives Act used to institute an investigation of
possible criminal charges in terms of the Act.
What about intervention by the liberation movements? 1 joined the African National Congress in
1990, and was appointed to its Archives Committee (a sub-committee of its Commission on Museums,
Monuments and Heraldry) in 1992. Within the Committee and other structures I was involved in there
was an acute awareness of the danger that the apartheid state was planning a mass destruction of public
records. The experience of Zimbabwe in the months preceding that country's independence was
frequently cited in discussions. It was felt to be imperative that the issue be put on the agenda during
negotiations with the apartheid government, and that the Congress's leadership should call for a
moratorium on the destruction of public records with immediate effect. The first formal
recommendation for such a moratorium was made at a meeting of the Commission on Museums,
Monuments and Heraldry in March 1992, and at the Congress's 1993 Conference on Culture and
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Development it was resolved that "there should be an immediate cessation of the destruction of all State
records regardless of existing policy." (22) However, it proved impossible to mobilise leadership behind
the issue It was not put on the table during the multi-party negotiation process. Support for Currin's
1993 legal intervention was limited to a media release backing his endeavour. When the Transitional
Executive Council was established in 1993, the liberation movements which participated failed to ensure
that the enabling legislation addressed the question of a moratorium. Moreover, the Transitional
Executive Council failed to take any action in the wake of the Currin settlement - the Council was, in the
words of Currin, "just paralysed and didn't respond". (23) Action was only to take place in 1995. In
June of that year the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee introduced a moratorium on the
destruction of all "intelligence documents". On 29 November 1995 Cabinet decided on a moratorium
which applied to all records of the state, irrespective of their age and irrespective of whether or not the
Director of Archives had authorised their destruction. This blanket moratorium endured until
completion of the TRC's work in 1998, whereafter it was narrowed to the records of the security
establishment. It will only be lifted when the amnesty process, begun by the TRC but not completed, is
concluded (24) These moratoria, of course, came too late. It is also not clear how effectively the
moratoria were communicated to and enforced within security establishment structures. Certainly NIS
and later NIA, as I pointed out earlier in this essay, continued destroying records after their
introduction, until as late as November 1996. It could be argued that more decisive intervention by the
African National Congress and the other liberation movements would not have prevented, nor even
curbed, the mass destruction. Nevertheless, this was a lever which sadly was not utilised.
In its findings on the destruction of public records in the period 1990-1994, the TRC
distinguished between culpability and accountability. (25) The former implies wrongdoing, the latter
shortcoming or negligence Identified as culpable were:
• Cabinet and the State Security Council, for sanctioning, from at least 1993, a government-wide
purging of official memory resources.
• NIS, for: beginning its purging exercise before Cabinet sanction was secured; initiating the process
which led to the adoption of government-wide destruction guidelines in 1993; defying the terms of
the Currin settlement by failing to revise its Vmidelines for the Protection of Classified Information,
and of supervising, or at least of failing to prevent, the purging of NSMS records.
• The Security Police, also for beginning its purging exercise before Cabinet sanction was secured.
• The numerous individual state officials and operatives who used the cloak provided by the
destruction endeavour to destroy or remove documents without authorisation.
Also found culpable were the NIA officials directly responsible for the destruction of records until as
late as November 1996, from 1995 in defiance of the two government moratoria. NIA's top
management were held accountable for not preventing this destruction. In terms of the period 1990-
1994, the TRC assigned accountability as follows:
• The head of the Security Secretariat, for the consequences of his July 1993 circular to all
government departments recommending the destruction of certain categories of classified record.
• The State Archives Service, for "the indecisive and ineffective steps it took to halt the destruction
endeavour".
• The liberation movements, for failing "to exercise all the leverage at their disposal in acting against
the endeavour".
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Conclusion
It is far too early to come to any conclusions about the impact of the 1990-1994 purge on social
memory in South Africa. Our knowledge of the purge relies heavily on the TRC investigation into
records destruction, an investigation severely constrained by a number of factors It operated with
limited resources within extremely tight timeframes. Of necessity it had ?.o rely on highly selective
probes into hot-spots, and in doing so was dependent to a greater or lesser degree on resources and co-
operation made available by state structures still in the initial stages of transformation. While for the
most part levels of support were excellent, there were cases of obstruction. <26) In my view, the TRC
investigation gave us a sound grasp of the broader processes of records destruction - the big picture -
and considerable insight into the impact of those processes within the security establishment It remains
for the National Archives and private researchers to extend these boundaries. What we can say at this
stage is that the evidence suggests a considerable impact on social memory Swathes of official
documentary memory, particularly around the inner workings of the apartheid state's security apparatus,
have been obliterated Moreover, the apparent complete destruction of records confiscated from
individuals and organisations over many years by the Security Police has removed from our heritage
arguably the country's richest accumulation of records documenting the struggles against apartheid The
overall work of the TRC suffered substantially as a result In seeking to reconstruct and understand the
past, so many pieces of that past's puzzle were missing. As the TRC itself indicated, "the destruction of
state documentation probably did more to undermine the investigative work of the Commission than any
other single factor." (27) For the most part the big picture, the fundamental shape and pattern of
process, was as clear as any interrogation of the past can be clear. But so often the details, the nuances,
the texture, the activities and experiences of individuals, was absent. On the other hand, TRC
investigation teams were often surprised by records accumulations which survived the purge One has
to ask why they survived. Imperfect central control over what was a vast bureaucracy? The presence of
individuals with consciences in the lower reaches of the state? Determination to preserve information
which could compromise the leadership of the new government? During the course of the investigation
I saw several files which could create severe difficulties for people now prominent in the public and
other sectors. At one point I remember one of my TRC colleagues turning to me with the comment:
"Perhaps it would have been better if all these files had been destroyed." More edifying has been the
discovery of extensive accumulations of records detailing the apartheid state's dispossession of
individuals' and communities' rights to land. The National Archives and the Department of Land Affairs
have worked closely with the National Commission for the Restitution of Land Rights to identify
substantial records series in state offices around the country which the Commission is using to
investigate land claims. Clearly, then, much work remains to be done before we have a comprehensive
picture of the scale and consequences of the 1990-1994 purge.
Imperfect as our understanding of the purge might be, we know enough to have learnt crucial
lessons from it. Perhaps the most important is the necessity for transparency and accountability in
government. As the transition to democracy has gathered momentum, "openness" and "disclosure" have
become watchwords both within the state and in broader societal processes This emphasis is
underpinned by the new Constitution's recognition of the public right of access to information,
particularly that held by the state. (28) However, it remains to be seen how well this lesson has been
learnt. Already evident is a strong counter-current, fed by state officials and structures who are finding
themselves blinded by all the light. There is now awareness within the state - honed by the impact of the
records destruction moratoria - that no state has the resources to preserve indefinitely all the information
in its systems. Selection procedures - choosing what to remember and what to forget - are essential
This to support both efficacy, in the longer term, of archival programmes, and protection of legitimate
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interests in confidentiality. But beyond the determining of memory's outer boundaries, the state is also
becoming adept at crafting the hidden places - the "official secret" - within that memory. Take the TRC,
torchbearer of disclosure, as an example. Some of its hearings were held in camera. Its records of
protected witnesses were secret. Information on certain decision-making processes and of internal
tensions and disputes was jealously kept out of the public domain. Its archive is subject to various
access restrictions. Some democrats accept that a measure of official secrecy is desirable; most accept it
as unavoidable But there are disturbing signs in South Africa that official secrecy is beginning to be
embraced as a point of departure. The state has effected no meaningful changes to the inherited systems
of information classification and staff security clearance. Increasingly the media are running into
government communications officials who constitute brick walls rather than gateways. At the same time
heat directed against media freedom by the state is gathering fuel. And "open democracy" legislation -
which will provide for freedom of information, the protection of private information, and the protection
of whistleblowers in the state - has been through a protracted gestation cloaked in secrecy. It seems that
for South Africans, particularly lawyers, journalists and activists, learning how to wrestle effectively
with the "official secret" will be essential The degree to which we are successful will be a crucial
measure of South Africa's demoralisation
The purge also highlighted the need for a democratic state to take appropriate measures to
prevent the sanitising of official memory resources. The cornerstone for such measures is the provision
of suitably powerful legal instruments to a state agency responsible for the auditing of public record-
keeping and. ideally, for managing public archives services as well. In many respects the 1962 Archives
Act constituted such an instrument, but it possessed four fatal flaws. Firstly, many state offices were
excluded, wholly or partially, from its operation. Secondly, its definition of "archives" (public records)
contained loopholes which the apartheid state was able to exploit ruthlessly. Thirdly, the penalty for
conviction on a charge of destroying a public record without archival authorisation was a laughable fine
ofR200 This did not constitute a deterrent. And fourthly, it provided no mechanisms for ensuring
accountability and transparency in the selection of public records for preservation by the Director of
Archives. All these flaws have been rectified by the National Archives of South Africa Act of 1996, and
the national government has put in place mechanisms to ensure that archival legislation passed by the
provinces follows the same model.
Needless to say, a powerful legal instrument without appropriate executive action is nothing
more than a dead letter. This was recognised by the TRC in three of its recommendations (29):
• Government should provide the National Archives with the resources it requires to give life to the
legislation. The power to inspect governmental bodies, for instance, is rendered meaningless if the
resources to exercise it are not made available. Current budgetary allocations to the National
Archives are woefully inadequate.
• Government should take steps to ensure that the positioning of the National Archives within the
state supports its function as the auditor of government record-keeping. Currently, as with the State
Archives Service in the past, the National Archives is positioned as a junior sub-component of a
non-central national department and lacks both the status and the autonomy it requires to perform
the auditing function. Unfortunately, this TRC recommendation loses its force through
contradictory elaboration - at one and the same time it advocates independent agency status (the
ideal) and positioning within either the office of the President or that of the Deputy President.
• The security establishment should not be allowed to escape the operation of the National Archives of
South Africa Act. While the Act brings security bodies firmly within its ambit, it does allow for
various exclusionary options. (30) It is conceded that a special status for such bodies appropriate to
the sensitivity of the records they generate would be legitimate, but that they should remain fully
subject to the professional supervision of the National Archives.
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The TRC also made several recommendations related to redressing the imbalances imposed on official
memory resources by the purge. (31) A number related to ensuring that the National Archives secures
control over the records of the security establishment which survived the purge In addition:
• The security establishment should make every attempt to locate and retrieve documents removed
without authorisation by operatives of apartheid security structures.
• The South African government should acknowledge that, in terms of internationally recognised
archival principles, the extant records of the South West Africa Territory Force (currently in the
custody of the SANDF Archives) properly belong in Namibia and must be returned to the Namibian
government. It was noted that an agreement between South Africa and Namibia covering equivalent
civilian records was already in place.
• The National Archives should be given the necessary resources to take transfer of, process
professionally and make available to the public, the TRC's own records (which fill many of the gaps
in official memory resources).
• The National Archives should be given the necessary resources to fill the gaps in official memory
resources through the collection of non-public records and the promotion of oral history projects
1 find the TRC recommendations compelling. It remains to be seen what the state makes of them
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